First of all, what is the Evolutionary Psychology that is being criticised here? There are admittedly big misunderstandings among outsiders what the research agenda is, and I’ll summarize a brief outline from Schmitt & Buss (2011, see above). The central idea is that our mental setup, including thoughts, feelings etc., has to be seen as outcome of an evolutionary process just like our physical one, with natural and sexual selection as the mechanisms that shape them. The in my opinion first somewhat counterintuitive and heuristically relevant claim is that this evolutionary process is manifested in quite specialized „psychological mechanisms, information processing devices“ that also respond to specific classes of information. Our thoughts, feelings and behavior then are the result of combination, coordination and integration of a large number of these mechanisms (and consciousness itself can be seen as an evolved device to achieve this integration). To think of Evolutionary Psychology as biological determinism is thus a common and big misunderstanding, because appropriate response to and interaction with different environmental factors is what these mechanisms are all about.

The search for these mechanisms is what characterizes most of Evolutionary Psychology research as far as I can tell, and is indeed a unique heuristic approach. All the same, the basic idea that evolution has shaped our mental setup seems to me about as trivial (very) as the basic claim of Neuroscience, that mental processes take place in the brain. And the value in and of itself of showing this in concrete examples I also consider equally low in both cases — the mere existence of a psychological mechanism that can be predicted from evolutionary hypotheses is as exciting (not at all) as the mere demonstration of a certain mental process correlating with activity in a certain brain region. Thus my first critique of Evolutionary Psychology: the field needs to be legitimized as achieving something more in either philosophical self-understanding or practical application.

This leads to my preliminary position on what and how we can know about „reality“, and what the role of science is in that process. I think that an at least mild constructivism is the only reasonable stance to adopt there. That means what we bring to our inquiry of reality in terms of interests, theoretical frameworks and research procedures has (at least) some impact on what we find — and that because a correspondence with reality beyond these preconditions is impossible to establish, scientific results cannot be evaluated based only on this correspondence with reality. The most reasonable proposed alternative (or complement) to „correspondence to reality“ as the standard for good science has been beautifully described by Jerome Bruner (1990. Acts of Meaning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London) as „the pragmatist’s questions — How does this view affect my view of the world or my commitments to it?“ And for me it follows from there that a critical examination of these influences as well as the „pragmatist“ consequences is indispensable.

If that sounded too abstract, be reminded of the myriad ways in which the design of a study, statistical techniques and interpretation of the outcomes influence the results. There is so much discouraging research on how findings are exaggerated in medicine (e.g. Thomas A. Trikalinos et al. (2004). Effect sizes in cumulative meta-analyses of mental health randomized trials evolved over time. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 57(11), 1124–1130. doi:10.1016/j.jclinepi.2004.02.018), a field with very rigorous established standards of research and also a powerful party with interests opposed to those of the primary researchers (inventors and marketers of new medical procedures and drugs vs. governments and insurance companies who pay the bills) — imagine what happens in a field like Evolutionary Psychology where there are much less established procedures and which relies a lot on questionnaire research in Western culture contexts, often using descriptive correlational findings in a specific culture as support for universal claims about causal genetic mechanisms. Actually, you don’t have to imagine, read „Why Most Published Research Findings Are False“ by John P. A. Ioannidis (PLoS Medicine 2(8): e124. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124) who concludes in the abstract: „for many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias.“

While this doesn’t render the idea of „better“ and „worse“ research in the sense of correspondence with reality useless, it certainly underlines the importance of examining which „mistakes“ in research are systematic due to an explicit or implicit agenda of the researchers and the dynamics inherent in the development of a theory. And to take into account the „pragmatist’s questions“ when considering accepting certain findings and whole research programs as part of our worldview.

I think this is not often made explicit by feminist critiques of Evolutionary Psychology, but I believe that most of them operate from a perspective on science similar to mine. And this is where evolutionary psychologist completely miss the point, and prefer to think of themselves as a purely „positive“ science describing „facts“ — dismissing criticism as committing the „naturalistic fallacy“. Let me illustrate this with two excerpts about „sexual coercion“ (the non-scientific term would be rape):

More generally, we believe that proponents of all theoretical perspectives should keep an open mind about the scientific hypothesis (and it is only that, a hypothesis), that men may have evolved adaptations for sexual coercion. It should go without saying that rape is illegal, immoral, and terribly destructive to women, and should in no way be condoned, whatever the ultimate causes turn out to be. Unfortunately, what should go without saying has to be repeated over and over, since those who advance evolutionary psychological hypotheses are unjustly accused of somehow condoning or excusing rape. The naturalistic fallacy, mistakenly inferring an ought from an is, seems to be a particularly stubborn error committed by critics of evolutionary psychology, despite the many published descriptions of this error (e.g., Confer et al. 2010). (Buss & Schmitt, 2011, see above)

In this spirit of simply stating the facts, this is the abstract of an article concerned with the connection between different female „mating strategies“ and sexual victimization:

Women show stable individual differences in mating strategies ranging from short-term to long-term. Short-term mating strategies may put women at greater risk of sexual victimization through increased exposure to risky situations or to men most inclined to pursue a strategy of sexual coercion. To test these predictions, we studied female college students who had experienced a completed rape, an attempted sexual victimization, or no sexual victimization. Women’s mating strategies were assessed through the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory. Victims further reported whether they engaged in consensual intimate behaviors with their victimizer before or after the victimization. Victims of completed rape scored highest on short-term mating strategy pursuit; non-victims scored lowest; women experiencing attempted victimization scored between these two groups. Victims of completed rape also more frequently reported consensual kissing and intercourse with their victimizer before and after the victimization than women who experienced attempted victimization. The findings of this study should not be interpreted as blaming the victim, but rather as identifying circumstances that put women at greater risk. Clearly, perpetrators are to blame for sexual victimization. Discussion focuses on future research directions and on practical implications for reducing rates of sexual victimization. (Complete Abstract of Carin Perilloux, Joshua D. Duntley, David M. Buss (2011). Susceptibility to sexual victimization and women’s mating strategies. Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 783–786. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.06.032)

From a feminist point of view it is cynical (and will often lead to an emotional rather than cool-minded response) that these statements which so obviously contribute to what is called „Rape Culture“ refer to aspirations of reducing sexual violence as their practical implications. The pillars of Rape Culture relevant here, in a nutshell, are the cultural believes around „men cannot resist sexual temptations and control their urges (at least some, and at least at a certain point)“ and „Women can and should avoid being raped in a variety of ways, especially through the way they dress and by avoiding casual sexual encounters“. These believes are at odds with findings in the feminist tradition that rapists are on the one hand a quite distinct group of men, and rape cases show a considerable amount of deliberation in choice of victim and circumstances, contradicting the „impulse“ trope. And on the other hand, they are enabled by widespread reiteration of exactly these believes, especially by other men.

A personal eye-opener for me was a seminar by „Men Can Stop Rape“ which I attended during my internship in a counseling center specialized in issues of sexuality (which means a lot of abuse and rape) in Glasgow. The seminar was attended by both men and women, and the facilitator started by asking the question „What do men usually do to avoid being raped“. After some laughter, the two responses from the plenum which were written on the blackboard were „avoid going to jail“ and „don’t pick up the soap“. The same question asked concerning women yielded a long long list of behaviors related to being in vulnerable places in public and especially in the dark, and all sorts of safety behaviors around going out and dating. So while recommendations for women on how to avoid getting into „risky“ situations may sound reasonable especially to male researchers and laymen at first, there is already a ridiculous amount of concerns women carry around on the issue, severely limiting their freedom to live a rewarding life. And while they don’t provide any real safety, because they don’t really causally relate to rape, they might help a little bit by at least avoiding to provide excuses to the perpetrators. But again, there are so many things women are supposed to do to avoid getting raped that it will be hard to find a single rape case where the woman didn’t do something that is seen as related to getting raped, tilting public opinion and the outcome of a court case in favor of the perpetrator.

What has here been illustrated for the problem of rape (which I consider one of the most pressing ones) applies in a similar fashion to questions of work, access to jobs in leading positions or political responsibilities. It applies to questions of housework and childrearing. It applies to domestic violence and abuse, where a recent publication by the same group (David M. Buss & Joshua D. Duntley (2011). The evolution of intimate partner violence. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 16, 411–419. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2011.04.015) innocently reports findings like a link between sexual infidelity and being victimized.

The conclusion of this epistemological line of thought is that even though I cannot at this point provide the reasons (and they would be interesting to know), social science that doesn’t have an explicit sociopolitical agenda seems to always slip into having the same implicit one: maintaining the status quo. And I believe this to be especially true for Evolutionary Psychology, Psychology in general and, as I have recently begun taking up to demonstrate, Economics.

Related to this is my argument that all social sciences should be „reflexive“ in two ways: Be able to explain their own activity as scientists and researchers as part of the psychological and social theories they develop, and be aware of the effects of their descriptions of people and society on what people actually do. I have recently started to look into that for economics, and was especially surprised to find how ignorance of the way our social organization and the descriptions thereof shape our behavior leads economists to cling to a thoroughly disproved „founding myth“ of pre-market societies‘ economic structures. As a side note, as far as I can tell our actual knowledge about what life was like in the „deep evolutionary time“ that has a central role in Evolutionary Psychology arguments is very limited, and feminists have a point when they say that what evolutionary psychologists think about especially the gender relations of that era looks „suspiciously like the American 50s“.

For evolutionary psychologists who advocate that even complex high-level behavior such as romantic feelings and relationships are essentially governed by evolved psychological mechanisms in the service of self-preservation and procreation, the same assumption certainly has to be made for their research endeavors. It already does a lot to take the edge out of their claims to objectivity and universality if you view their activities and proclamations as a means of predominantly upper-class men to advance their access to desirable „mates“ by, e.g., claiming that what they have to offer on the „mating market“ is what women in general are (and most people will read: should be) looking for.

This naturally leads to the other side of the reflexivity issue. I strongly believe that a culture in which stories like this are passed around for facts will have different relationships than a culture with a different, or maybe just more diverse, story on the interactions between men and women:

Sexual conflict, for example, can occur on the “mating market” over whether or not sexual intercourse will occur or in the amount of time and investment required before sexual intercourse will occur. Deception and sexual persistence are two common tactics men use in the “battleground” of pre-mating sexual conflict (Buss, 1989a; Haselton, Buss, Oubaid, & Angleitner, 2005). Deflecting sexual attention, imposing longer time delays, and requiring additional signals of commitment are common tactics women use in the “battleground” of pre-mating sexual conflict. (Buss & Duntley, 2011, see above. Emphasis original)

First of all, take a moment to link the descriptions of normal and expected male „tactics“ like deception and sexual persistence back to the rape culture arguments. Second, while the argument makes immediate sense from a point of view of evolutionary logic, think about how well this describes what you observe in your own love life and that of the people around you. My personal answer to that is: not very. And while I don’t want to claim that personal experience is what science has to be measured against, I want to make the point that often to see the flaws in a certain argument you have to step out of the frame of reference of that argument (in this example: from abstract-logical to concrete-experiential). Thus my bottom line: A valid and successful feminist critique of Evolutionary Psychology does not try to disprove empirical claims to differences between men and women applying the same methods as Evolutionary Psychology does. It points out the flaws in Evolutionary Psychology’s objectivist scientific premise and holds it accountable for both motivations guiding the research process and practical implications of its results, including their public reception.

Where does all this leave Evolutionary Psychology as a field? In my opinion in need of an explicit agenda of why they are doing research and what they want to achieve with it. And a good argument as to how their products (both their explicit „findings“ as well as spreading their mode of thinking into popular culture) contributes to a better society. I believe that for some branches of Evolutionary Psychology, that can be done successfully. But for many others I am pessimistic, and this includes the whole field occupied with evolutionary gender roles and relations.

It also means that feminist critique that seems to misunderstand Evolutionary Psychology, especially where the „naturalistic fallacy“ comes into play, should be read as coming from some roughly constructivist-pragmatist viewpoint similar to what I have described, and as asking accountability for what findings and research process do to our actual social world. Which certainly doesn’t mean that all feminist critique is right. But a lot of it that sounds stupid if you stay within a positivist view of science suddenly makes sense if you appreciate what they are actually talking about.

Studies of correlations among twins or adoptees and their biological and adoptive parents typically yield large genetic effects and relatively smaller effects of family environment, whereas studies that compare the mean IQs of children rescued from poverty with the IQs of their parents or impoverished siblings often find large differences that are attributed to the environment (Turkheimer, 1991).

So what Sarrazin quotes in terms of high heritability is only half of the truth. How can these disparate findings be unified? Here is the hypothesis that was confirmed in the study:

One possible resolution of this paradox is that the effect of family environment on cognitive ability could be nonlinear (Jensen, 1981; Scarr, 1981). If differences between impoverished environments and adequate ones have large consequences for cognitive ability, but differences between adequate and enriched environments do not, one would expect amelioration of impoverished status to show a substantial effect, whereas correlational findings based on middle-class family members in typical twin and adoption studies would not.

In a way (as has been rightfully pointed out for the debate as a whole) this is just elaborating on what has been said on differences in IQ between groups before: A certain degree of heritability within a group says close to nothing about the genetic differences between groups. The quoted article just shows how this applies to socioeconomic groups as well es ethnic groups, which had been a central issue in the similar debate in the US some 15 years ago.

Which makes Sarrazins point (Germany is threatened by an increase in proportion of genetically less intelligent individuals due to different rates of reproduction between socio-economic groups) scientifically implausible on top of what it has been from the beginning: politically and morally tasteless and neglecting of the historic dimension and practical implications of trying to change the genetic composition of society.

Apart from that, I think it is useful to point out an old misunderstanding with the theory of evolution: One naively tends to conclude that evolution must favor intelligence, and that the „natural“ way of things should be for intelligent people to procreate more. This would make the (assumed) opposite direction of „evolutionary shift“ due to the way our society is structured „unnatural“ and imply that it is wrong (which is itself a moral-philosophic misunderstanding called the Naturalistic Fallacy). However, the fact that there still are genetically more and less intelligent (one should say: predisposed to developing intelligence) people around proves that „evolution“ has nothing against them. If one wanted to speculate wildly and freely one could say that „evolution likes them“ precisely for the fact that they procreate more… A remotely similar point has recently been made about sheep with stronger and weaker immune systems and, some years ago, about learning ability in fruit flies.

I have strayed from the topic, but I’m glad I had an opportunity to link to that sheep article in a useful way after all

Hier eine zentrale Aussage Ostrers aus der SZ, die die Erkenntnisse in Relation bringt:

Versuche, eine Gruppe aufgrund der Genetik einiger weniger Mitglieder zu typisieren, führen in die Irre. Die Erforschung der menschlichen Populationsgenetik macht Fortschritte und vielleicht stellt man in Zukunft einmal fest, dass eine Gruppe A eine größere Häufigkeit (vielleicht sechs Prozent) einer genetischen Variante hat, die für Alkoholismus anfällig macht, während eine Gruppe B eine andere Häufigkeit dieser Variante (vielleicht vier Prozent) aufweist. Die Gruppe A nun als Trinker und die Gruppe B als Abstinenzler zu bezeichnen, wäre schlicht und einfach falsch. Doch genau solche Typologien sind das fortbestehende Erbe der Rassenkunde des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.

Eine wichtige Unterscheidung ist dabei zwischen Scham und Schuld zu treffen — erstere (laut den Wissenschaftlern das Gefühl, aufgrund schlechten Verhaltens ein schlechter Mensch zu sein) ist verständlicherweise destruktiv, letztere (stärker mit der Handlung als der Person assoziiert) hilft, unser Verhalten in sozialer Weise zu lenken.

Hier ein paar Details des spannenden Experiments mit Kindern, und Ratschläge zur Erziehung:

Die Versuchsanordnung:

Show a toy — a doll, say, or a model boat — to a toddler and explain that it it’s something special you’ve had since you were little. Ask the child to be “very careful” with it. Hand over the toy, which appears to be in fine condition, except that you’ve secretly rigged it to break spectacularly as soon as the child handles it.

When your precious toy falls apart, express regret by mildly saying, “Oh, my.” Then sit still and observe the child.

The point is not to permanently traumatize anyone — the researchers who performed this experiment quickly followed it with a ritual absolving the child of blame. But first, for 60 seconds after the toy broke, the psychologists recorded every reaction as the toddlers squirmed, avoided the experimenter’s gaze, hunched their shoulders, hugged themselves and covered their faces with their hands.

Und die Prognosen für die folgenden fünf Jahre:

In Dr. Kochanska’s latest studies, published in the August issue of The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, she and colleagues found that 2-year-olds who showed more chagrin during the broken-toy experiment went on to have fewer behavioral problems over the next five years. That was true even for the ones who scored low on tests measuring their ability to focus on tasks and suppress strong desires to act impulsively.

“If you have high guilt,” Dr. Kochanska said, “it’s such a rapid response system, and the sensation is so incredibly unpleasant, that effortful control doesn’t much matter.”

But self-control was critical to children in the studies who were low in guilt, because they still behaved well if they had high self-control.

Was bedeutet das für die Erziehung? Außerdem der Weg, die im Experiment aufgewühlten Gefühle zu beruhigen:

“The key element is the difference between shame and guilt,” Dr. Tangney says. Shame, the feeling that you’re a bad person because of bad behavior, has repeatedly been found to be unhealthy, she says, whereas guilty feelings focused on the behavior itself can be productive. But it’s not enough, Dr. Tangney says, for parents just to follow the old admonition to criticize the sin, not the sinner. “Most young children,” Dr. Tangney said, “really don’t hear the distinction between ‘Johnny, you did a bad thing’ versus ‘Johnny, you’re a bad boy.’ They hear ‘bad kid.’ I think a more active, directive approach is needed.”

She recommends focusing not just on the bad deed, but more important, on how to make amends. “Both children and adults can be surprisingly clueless about whether and how to make things right,” Dr. Tangney said. “Little kids are overwhelmed by the spilled mess of milk on the floor. Parents can teach and support them to say ‘I’m sorry’ and to clean it up, maybe leaving the kitchen a little cleaner than it was before.”

That was the same atonement strategy, by the way, followed by the experimenters in Iowa who tricked the children with the broken toy. After the 60 seconds of angst, the children were asked what had happened and then were told that the toy could be easily repaired. The researcher would then leave the room with the broken toy and return in half a minute with an intact replica of it. The experimenter took the blame for having caused the damage, reassuring the children that it wasn’t their fault and that the toy was now as good as new anyway.

Eating fatty food appears to take an almost immediate toll on both short-term memory and exercise performance, according to new research on rats and people.

Other studies have suggested that long-term consumption of a high-fat diet is associated with weight gain, heart disease and declines in cognitive function. But the new research shows how indulging in fatty foods over the course of a few days can affect the brain and body long before the extra pounds show up.

Ratten verschlechtern sich in bereits gelernten Aufgaben, die Gedächtnisleistung erfordern, innerhalb weniger Tage, und auch die körperliche Leistungsfähigkeit geht um ein Drittel (!) zurück.

“We expected to see changes, but maybe not so dramatic and not in such a short space of time,’’ said Andrew Murray, the study’s lead author and a lecturer in physiology at Cambridge University in Britain. “It was really striking how quickly these effects happened.’’

Although the human data aren’t yet published, the researchers have also performed similar studies of high-fat diets in healthy young men who then performed exercise and cognitive tests. Dr. Murray said he is still reviewing the data, but the short-term effect of a fatty diet on humans appears to be similar to that found in the rat studies.

Ein weiterer Grund, den Anteil an Pflanzen in der Nahrung zu erhöhen … Vermutlich war selbst die fettreichste Ernährung unserer evolutionären Vorfahren weit entfernt vom durchschnittlichen zeitgenössischen Speiseplan.

Die Gründe für die starken und schnellen Effekte sind noch spekulativ:

It’s not clear why fatty foods would cause a short-term decline in cognitive function. One theory is that a high-fat diet can trigger insulin resistance, which means the body becomes less efficient at using the glucose, or blood sugar, so important to brain function.

Fatty foods appear to have a short-term effect on exercise performance because the body reacts to high fat content in the blood by releasing certain proteins that essentially make the metabolism less efficient. “It’s thought to be a protective mechanism to get rid of excess fat,’’ Dr. Murray said. “But it was making muscles less efficient at using oxygen and fuel to make the energy needed to run.’’

Zunächst die Geschichte:

Der ausgewachsene Kleine Leberegel lebt meistens im Gallengang eines Schafes oder Rindes. Nur selten befällt er auch Menschen. Die Eier des Parasiten gelangen über den Kot der Tiere ins Freie. Wegen der pflanzlichen Rückstände stellen die Ausscheidungen für Schnecken „eine willkommene Nahrung dar“ (Johannes Eckert u. a.: Lehrbuch der Parasitologie für die Tiermedizin, 2005).

Im Körper der Schnecke bilden die Eier dann Leberegel-Larven. Diese wandern diese bis in die Atemhöhle der Schnecke. Dort werden sie in einen Schleimbrocken gehüllt von dem Weichtier ausgehustet. Diesem Schneckenschleim können nun offenbar Ameisen kaum wiederstehen und fressen ihn auf.

War das Szenario bis hierher schon abenteuerlich, so wird es jetzt geradezu gespenstisch: Während der Großteil des Leberegel-Nachwuchses in der Leibeshöhle der Ameise weiter heranreift, setzt sich eine Larve im Gehirn des Insekts fest — und manipuliert dessen Verhalten.

Der sogenannte Hirnwurm bewirkt bei der Ameise ein völlig untypisches Verhalten: Statt am Abend in ihr Nest zurückzukehren, klettert die Ameise an die Spitze eines Grashalms. Dort beißt sie sich fest — und wird an diesem prominenten Platz mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit von einem Schaf oder Rind verspeist. Auf diesem Wege gelangen die Larven des Kleinen Leberegels in ihren Hauptwirt, wo sie sich fertig entwickeln können. Dann beginnt der Zyklus von Neuem.

Ganz schön verrückt. Und die Vorstellung, dass sich das alles irgendwie evolutionär entwickelt haben muss, einschließlich der Aufgabenteilung der Larven und der gezielten Verhaltensmanipulation, macht mir schwindlig.

Nach der Geschichte vom kleinen Leberegel noch ein paar abstraktere Details:

Die große Durchsetzungskraft der parasitierenden Lebensformen zeigt sich aber auch an ihrer schieren Zahl: So kommen nach Schätzungen von Forschern auf jede Art von Wirtsorganismus vier Arten, die sich als Schmarotzer ihr Überleben sichern (Matthias Gräbner: Jede Menge Parasiten, Telepolis, 24.7.2008).

Wie ein internationales Forscherteam kürzlich herausfand, spielen Parasiten zudem im Ökosystem offenbar eine größere Rolle als bislang vermutet: Bei Untersuchungen an mehreren Flussmündungen bildeten die kleinen Lebensformen einen größeren Anteil an der Biomasse — also der Gesamheit der Masse an organischem Material — als zuvor angenommen.

Besonders hervor stachen demnach die Saugwürmer, zu denen auch der Kleine Leberegel gehört: Ihre Biomasse lag gleichauf mit der der Fische. (Nature 454, 515 — 518 (24.7.2008), doi: 10.1038/nature06970 / Matthias Gräbner: Jede Menge Parasiten, Telepolis, 24.7.2008).

Vier schmarotzende Arten auf jeden Wirt? Und die selbe Biomasse? Ich möchte mir nicht vorstellen, wie es wäre, mit meinem Gewicht an Flöhen und ähnlichem im Bett zu liegen… Hier also doch mal ein entschiedenes „Danke schön“ an die Errungenschaften der modernen Zivilisation. Oder schneiden wir uns am Ende doch ins eigene Fleisch, wenn wir uns die Parasiten so nachdrücklich vom Leib halten?

Die Wandlungsfähigkeit von Parasiten ist so eminent, dass sie sogar als eine der entscheidenden Triebfedern für die Evolution angesehen wird. (Rachel Nowak: Life’s greatest inventions, New Scientist, 9.4.2005).

So gibt es einer evolutionsbiologischen Theorie zufolge nur deshalb zwei Geschlechter, weil Menschen und Tiere allein mit Hilfe ständiger Durchmischung und der Schaffung neuer Immunsysteme den anpassungsfähigen Parasiten — hier vor allem Viren und Bakterien — etwas entgegensetzen können.

Auf einer Speisekarte in einem Restaurant stattet man die in einem Festpreis-Menü wählbaren Hauptgänge mit vorgeblichen Preisen aus, die sie beim Einzelkauf kosten würden. Theoretisch (und Laborbefunden folgend) sollten dann die angeblich teureren Sachen häufiger gewählt werden, weil sie ja wertvoller sind besser sein müssen. Passiert aber nicht. Das mag daran liegen, dass wir wenn’s ums Essen geht doch ganz gut wissen, was wir „wirklich“ wollen. Oder dass Laborbefunde ein Problem haben:

“Maybe, sometimes, old-fashioned economics is just about right,” Dr. Shayo says. “Maybe when it comes to food, people do have reasonably stable preferences. Some people like shrimp and some don’t, even if it’s worth a lot of money.”

The researchers don’t deny that consumers can be swayed by variations in sticker prices in laboratory experiments. But they question how significant that factor is in real-world settings where prices can’t be inflated so extremely, like the Tel Aviv restaurant. “Size is everything,” Dr. Heffetz says. “Our findings remind us that knowing that ‘A has a positive effect on B’ is not enough. The effect may simply be too small to matter.”

Ich fürchte, dass eine Menge Wissenschaftler darüber nochmal nachdenken sollten.

Weiter mit dem Thema Evolution: Leser eines Blogs werden gebeten, Listen zu schicken, die jeweils separat ihre 10 teuersten Einkäufe und die 10 Einkäufe, die ihnen am meisten Glück bereitet haben enthalten:

The size-matters effect seemed to show up in a much less rigorous bit of research conducted at my TierneyLab blog with the help of Geoffrey Miller, an evolutionary psychologist at the University of New Mexico. In his new book, “Spent: Sex, Evolution and Consumer Behavior” (Viking), he argues that humans often waste money because of the unconscious — and mistaken — belief that our costly stuff will signal our intelligence and sterling personality traits to potential mates and allies.

As an exercise, Dr. Miller asked readers of the blog to list the 10 most expensive things they had ever bought, and then list the 10 purchases that had brought them the most happiness. More than 200 responded. As we expected, many people rued spending lots of money for stuff that hadn’t brought them joy. Boats seemed to have particularly low utility in delivering happiness per dollar; many cars fit that category, too, and so did many expensive weddings.

But we were struck by how much overlap there was between the most-expensive list and the most-happy list. People repeatedly included on both lists their homes, their college education, their vacation trips, their high-priced electronics (large-screen televisions, Blu-Ray player, audio equipment, computers) and certain models of cars (BMW 325, Audi A4, Jaguar, Subaru WRX, Toyota Prius, Honda Civic).

Indeed, the first trend that Dr. Miller identified was the match between the happiness and expense lists. Some of this may have been because of postpurchase rationalization, but a lot of buyers seemed to be suffering anything but remorse. As one reader, Janet Hubbs, put it:

“The three things (not necessities) I have spent the most money on in the past ten years are: my cottage at Cape Cod, my Lexus, and my Rolex — and I LOVE all three, in the order of their cost. And I don’t care what that says about me.”

Und die Listen überschneiden sich also erheblich. Ob man damit aber die Eingangsthese widerlegen kann, dass viele unserer Anschaffungen wegen der Signalwirkung und nicht wegen der direkten Nützlichkeit gekauft werden, bezweifle ich. Denn dass die Signalwirkung auch glücklich machen kann, ist ja genau der Sinn der Sache. Und warum genau Janet Hubbs ihre Rolex so beglückt müsste man sie am besten fragen. Vermutlich, weil sie dann immer weiß wie spät es ist? Aber hier kommen wir in ein Gebiet, wo vielleicht nicht nur das Laborexperiment an seine Grenzen stößt.

The new fight is one Dr. Wilson has picked. It concerns a central feature of evolution, one with considerable bearing on human social behaviors. The issue is the level at which evolution operates. Many evolutionary biologists have been persuaded, by works like “The Selfish Gene” by Richard Dawkins, that the gene is the only level at which natural selection acts. Dr. Wilson, changing his mind because of new data about the genetics of ant colonies, now believes that natural selection operates at many levels, including at the level of a social group.

It is through multilevel or group-level selection — favoring the survival of one group of organisms over another — that evolution has in Dr. Wilson’s view brought into being the many essential genes that benefit the group at the individual’s expense. In humans, these may include genes that underlie generosity, moral constraints, even religious behavior. Such traits are difficult to account for, though not impossible, on the view that natural selection favors only behaviors that help the individual to survive and leave more children.

“I believe that deep in their heart everyone working on social insects is aware that the selection that created them is multilevel selection,” Dr. Wilson said.

Scientist at Work — Edward O. Wilson — E.O Wilson Takes Cue From Ants in His Views on Human Social Evolution — NYTimes.com

Dennoch bleibt ein doppeltes Interesse bestehen: Zum einen ein philosphisches an besserem Verständnis unserer historisch-evolutionären Wurzeln. Und (wichtiger) als Argument gegen Marktideologen, die sich ja oft genug darauf berufen, dass Menschen nun mal nicht anders könnten als an ihren eigenen Nutzen denken, und deshalb ein System, in dem der Eigennutz zentral ist, die einzige realistische Möglichkeit sei.

In der NYTimes wird jetzt Forschung dargestellt, die sich mit moralischer Heuchelei beschäftigt. Darunter versteht man das Phänomen, Verhalten von anderen an anderen Standards zu messen als das eigene, sich also Handlungen zum eigenen Vorteil zu erlauben, die man an anderen verurteilen würde.

Dieser Effekt ist sehr stark, und zwar sowohl in Bezug auf sich selbst als auch auf Zugehöriger der eigenen Gruppe, selbst in Minimalgruppendesigns (wenn „Gruppe“ also z.B. nur heißt „trägt ein Armband der selben Farbe).

Und man stellt sich die Frage, über welche Mechanismen das funktioniert. Vor allem, ob es sich um eine emotional verankertes oder kognitives Verhalten handelt. Das Ergebnis vorweg: Das „richtige“ Gefühl für Fairness, das also keinen Unterschied macht, ob ich selbst oder jemand anderes sich unfair bevorteilt, scheint das tiefere zu sein, das ohne geistige Anstrengung auftritt. Schön, nicht?

Und passt gut zu meiner Überzeugung, dass die rationale Einschätzung unserer heutigen Lebensweise (und meiner Meinung nach auch eine rational richtige) uns dazu bringt, teilweise gegen unseren Willen und unsere Empfindungen unsozial zu handeln. Es herrscht das verbreitete Gefühl, andere würden skrupellos handeln und man bliebe auf der Strecke, wenn man es selbst nicht auch tut. Und so steigen wir unter kognitiver Anstrengung über unsere prosozialen Instinkte hinweg und machen uns gegenseitig das Leben schwer. Blöd, nicht?

“The question here,” Dr. DeSteno said, “is whether we’re designed at heart to be fair or selfish.”

To find out, he and Dr. Valdesolo brought more people into the lab and watched them selfishly assign themselves the easy task. Then, at the start of the subsequent questioning, some of these people were asked to memorize a list of numbers and retain it in their heads as they answered questions about the experiment and their actions.

That little bit of extra mental exertion was enough to eliminate hypocrisy. These people judged their own actions just as harshly as others did. Their brains were apparently too busy to rationalize their selfishness, so they fell back on their intuitive feelings about fairness.

“Hypocrisy is driven by mental processes over which we have volitional control,” said Dr. Valdesolo, a psychologist at Amherst College. “Our gut seems to be equally sensitive to our own and others’ transgressions, suggesting that we just need to find ways to better translate our moral feelings into moral actions.”

Findings — Deep Down, We Can’t Fool Even Ourselves — NYTimes.com